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[T]he purchase by the American [Telegraph and Telephone] company, either
in its own name or in the names of others, of the majority stock of the
Kellogg [Switchboard and Supply] company with the purpose and intent
of controlling the latter and putting it out of business as a competitor . . .
was an attempt to exercise a power which it did not have. . . . [I]t would
seem to follow that each and every stockholder in the latter company
would have the right to say that the American company . . . should be
restrained.
—Justice Jacob W. Wilkin, Illinois Supreme Court (1906)1

1. Dunbar v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 224 Ill. 9 (1906), at 25–26.
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In 1903 the American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T) bought
a majority interest in the Kellogg Switchboard and Supply Company,
allegedly with the aim of eliminating competition in the telephone business. Perhaps it is not remarkable that the Illinois Supreme Court ruled
this acquisition of an Illinois corporation to be illegal. What is noteworthy,
however, is that the court took this step at the behest of a group of
Kellogg’s minority shareholders who had ﬁled suit to block the deal.
Judges had long responded skeptically to such actions, worried that shareholders would clog the courts with challenges to managers’ decisions or,
even worse, use the courts opportunistically to extract payouts from their
companies. But they began to change their minds during the Great
Merger Movement of the turn of the century. As thousands of previously
competing ﬁrms disappeared into giant consolidations that controlled the
lion’s share of their industries, judges concerned about the increase in market power in the United States economy came to see “each and every stockholder” as a potential ally in the struggle against monopoly.
As we show in this article, judges went through a similar progression in
their thinking about voting trusts; that is, agreements by which stockholders transferred their shares in a corporation, and the voting rights that went
along with them, to one or more trustees who then exercised control.
Initially judges had responded positively to such agreements, recognizing
that they could further desirable goals such as ensuring managerial stability
or inducing bankers to come to the aid of a company in ﬁnancial distress.
By the late nineteenth century, however, the Standard Oil Company and
other large consolidations had demonstrated that voting trusts could also
be used to evade state laws forbidding corporations from owning stock
in other companies and to suppress price cutting by merging competitors
into giant combines. After New Jersey famously liberalized its general
incorporation statute to permit holding companies, this use of voting trusts
abated, but by the 1910s, critics were again presenting evidence that the
“money trust” was exploiting the device for purposes of economic domination. Both sets of revelations encouraged judges to rethink the legal
rules governing voting trusts, and to restore market competition, they
increasingly supported shareholders’ attempts to invalidate these
agreements.
Scholars have long understood that the American regulatory system differs from its European counterpart in the extraordinary extent to which it
relies on private lawsuits. Political scientist Sean Farhang has shown, for
example, that conﬂict with the president during the 1960s led Congress
to build a “private enforcement regime” for the Civil Rights Act of 1964
by deliberately embedding provisions in the legislation that empowered
any person “aggrieved” by discriminatory behavior to seek injunctive
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relief.2 Legal scholars have similarly highlighted the important role in
American jurisprudence played by “private attorneys general.” Judge
Jerome Frank coined the phrase in a 1943 federal appeals court decision
interpreting the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937, which granted standing to
persons “aggrieved” by orders of the coal commission to appeal to the
relevant federal circuit.3 In fact, however, this type of regulatory design
goes back at least to the False Claims Act of 1863, which authorized private citizens to sue and collect damages from individuals who defrauded
the government.4 It also played an important role in antitrust enforcement
from the very beginning. The Sherman Act of 1890 gave any person or
company injured by anticompetitive behavior the right to sue in federal
court and recover treble damages, and most state antitrust statutes included
similar inducements. Although the number of private antitrust suits ﬁled
over the next couple of decades was small by the standards of the late
twentieth century, it surpassed contemporary prosecutions by federal and
state ofﬁcials combined.5
Important though these private antitrust actions were in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, they were only part of the story of
how private litigants advanced competition policy. As we show in this article, lawsuits brought by shareholders under state general incorporation
laws also played a signiﬁcant role in limiting anticompetitive conduct
and extending the government’s regulatory capacity, though one that has
largely gone unnoticed in the literature. Whereas the literature on private
enforcement regimes and private attorneys general highlights the conscious
way in which legislatures harnessed private litigation for policy ends, we
2. Sean Farhang, The Litigation State: Public Regulation and Private Lawsuits in the U.S.
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). See, for example, Title II, Sec. 204 (a) of the
1964 Civil Rights Act. See also Joseph F. DiMento, “Citizen Environmental Legislation in
the States: An Overview,” Journal of Urban Law 53 (1976): 413–61; and Karen Tani,
“Training the Citizen-Enforcers of Disability Rights, 1978–1982: A Case Study in Law
and Democracy,” unpublished working paper (2019). More generally, see William
J. Novak, “The Myth of the ‘Weak’ American State,” American Historical Review 113
(2008): 752–72.
3. William B. Rubenstein, “On What a ‘Private Attorney General’ Is—And Why it
Matters,” Vanderbilt Law Review 57 (2004): 2129–73, at 2133–73; and Associated Indus.
of N.Y. State v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (1943), at 704.
4. John C. Coffee, Jr., Entrepreneurial Litigation: Its Rise, Fall, and Future (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), 14.
5. Joseph E. Davies, Trust Laws and Unfair Competition (Washington, DC: Government
Printing Ofﬁce, 1916), 211–16; James May, “Antitrust Practice and Procedure in the
Formative Era: The Constitutional and Conceptual Reach of State Antitrust Law, 1880–
1918,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 135 (1987): 495–593, at 503 n. 61; and
Richard A. Posner, “A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement,” Journal of Law &
Economics 13 (1970): 365–419, at 371.
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extend this analysis by documenting for the case of antitrust law the parallel efforts that judges made to turn private civil suits in adjacent areas
of the law into tools of regulatory policy. In the process, we also contribute
to the growing body of literature challenging the conventional wisdom that
the states, which early on had taken the lead in antitrust prosecutions, had
largely ceded this terrain to the federal government by the early twentieth
century. Scholars have documented the ongoing vigor of antitrust initiatives in states like Texas and Kansas and have shown that these efforts
reshaped the structure of important national industries like petroleum.6
We go beyond this literature by showing that state legislatures throughout
the United States reinforced judges’ initiatives by revising their corporation
laws in ways that made it easier for shareholders to challenge anticompetitive mergers. More importantly, we show that legislatures responded to the
legal uncertainty that judges’ changing views of voting trusts produced by
passing laws that effectively removed the devices from the monopolists’
tool kit. In the end, we argue, these revisions to state incorporation statutes
were as important as the Clayton Act in limiting ﬁnance capitalism’s reach
over the American economy. In combination with federal and state antitrust
statutes, they exerted an enduring check on monopoly power in the United
States economy.

The Ongoing Importance of State Antitrust Enforcement
Standard Oil sparked the antitrust movement in the 1880s when its lawyers
ﬁgured out how to evade state prohibitions on holding companies by using
a voting trust to consolidate the petroleum industry. Although courts generally allowed majority shareholders to form voting trusts to stabilize control in their own companies, exploitation of the device as a tool of
horizontal combination was something new, and Standard’s innovation
inspired imitators in a number of industries, ranging from sugar to cottonseed oil to whisky to lead.7 It also provoked a political backlash. Even
before Congress enacted the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890, more than a
6. For an overview, see Naomi R. Lamoreaux, “Antimonopoly and State Regulation of
Corporations in the Gilded Age and Progressive Era,” in Antimonopoly and American
Democracy, ed. Daniel A. Crane and William J. Novak (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2022), forthcoming.
7. Allan Nevins, Study in Power: John D. Rockefeller, Industrialist and Philanthropist
(New York: Scribner, 1953), Vol. I, ch. 21; Harold F. Williamson and Arnold R. Daum,
The American Petroleum Industry: The Age of Illumination, 1859–1899 (Evanston, IL:
Northwestern University Press, 1959), 466–70; Ralph W. Hidy and Muriel E. Hidy,
Pioneering in Big Business, 1882–1911 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955), 40–49;
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dozen states had passed laws criminalizing combinations that restrained
trade or aimed to create a monopoly, and most of the rest would follow
over the next decade.8 At the same time, state attorneys general began to
launch quo warranto suits to revoke the charters of corporations that participated in trusts. Literally meaning “by what authority,” quo warranto
proceedings allowed state courts to dissolve corporations that joined combines on the grounds that the arrangements violated the terms of their charters.9 All that prosecutors had to document was the ultra vires character of
the agreement—not the extent to which it restrained trade. As New York’s
high court declared in a case involving the sugar trust, “[T]he defendant
corporation has violated its charter and failed in the performance of its corporate duties. . . . Having reached that result, it becomes needless to
advance into the wider discussion over monopolies and competition and
restraint of trade.”10
The ability to bring quo warranto suits meant that states had a powerful
weapon to wield against combines that the federal government did not possess. Some contemporaries believed that the states’ regulatory powers over
corporations took precedence over, and hence constrained, those of the
federal government. Others worried that federal intervention would
undermine states’ authority over their corporate creatures. As legal
historian Charles McCurdy has shown, Chief Justice Melville Fuller’s infamous distinction between manufacturing and commerce in United States
v. E. C. Knight (1895), a federal antitrust suit against the sugar trust,
was a deliberate effort to preserve the states’ power to regulate corporations. If the Supreme Court had invoked the Constitution’s commerce
clause to break up the trust, it would have pre-empted state law, creating
what Fuller feared would be a legal vacuum. Contemporaries tried several
times to resolve the problem by securing a federal incorporation law, but
these efforts failed.11
and William W. Cook, “Trusts”: The Recent Combinations in Trade, their Character,
Legality and Mode of Organization . . . (New York: L. K. Strouse & Co., 1888).
8. Morris D. Forkosch, Antitrust and the Consumer (Enforcement) (Buffalo: Dennis,
1956), 220–31, 412–32; and Henry R. Seager and Charles A. Gulick, Jr., Trust and
Corporation Problems (New York: Harper, 1929), 51, 339–66.
9. May, “Antitrust Practice and Procedure”; and Paul Nolette, “Litigating the ‘Public
Interest’ in the Gilded Age: Common Law Business Regulation by Nineteenth-Century
State Attorneys General,” Polity 44 (2012): 373–99.
10. People v. North River Sugar Reﬁning Co., 121 N.Y. 582 (1890), at 626.
11. Charles W. McCurdy, “The Knight Sugar Decision of 1895 and the Modernization of
American Corporation Law, 1869–1903,” Business History Review 53 (1979): 304–42;
Naomi R. Lamoreaux, The Great Merger Movement in American Business, 1895–1904
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), ch. 6; Melvin I. Urofsky, “Proposed
Federal Incorporation in the Progressive Era,” American Journal of Legal History 26
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Notwithstanding Fuller’s concern, the locus of antitrust activity shifted
during the early twentieth century from the states to the federal government. Scholars have advanced three related explanations for this development: New Jersey’s liberalization of its general incorporation laws and the
resulting regulatory race to the bottom, states’ reluctance to inﬂict harm on
their domestic economies by prosecuting combines chartered in other
states, and states’ increasing inability to control businesses operating in
broader national or even international markets.12 Although the heightened
importance of federal antitrust initiatives was certainly very real, more
recent scholarship has cast doubt on these explanations, highlighting the
ongoing vigor with which at least some states continued to pursue antitrust
agendas and suggesting that the literature has exaggerated the extent to
which states raced to the bottom. What emerges from this newer research
is not a simple story of a shift from state to federal authority, but rather a
more complex political-economic analysis that points to the persistence of
variation across states in the extent and signiﬁcance of antitrust activity.13
Most state attorneys general were popularly elected. They had considerable discretion about whether or not to proceed against trusts, and they
responded to the enormous political pressures to which they were subject
in heterogeneous ways. At one extreme, Ohio’s attorney general ﬁled
suit to dissolve the Standard Oil Company despite overt threats to his political future from Republican Party bosses.14 At the other, Massachusetts’
top lawyer resisted a concerted newspaper campaign that he take action
against the trusts.15 New York’s attorney general went after the
(1982): 160–83; Arthur M. Johnson, “Antitrust Policy in Transition, 1908: Ideal and
Reality,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review 48 (1961): 415–34; Martin J. Sklar, The
Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890–1916: The Market, the Law,
and Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 228–85; and Daniel
A. Crane, “The Dissociation of Incorporation and Regulation in the Progressive Era and
the New Deal,” in Corporations and American Democracy, ed. Naomi R. Lamoreaux and
William J. Novak (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017), 109–38.
12. US Commissioner of Corporations, “Report,” House Doc 165, 58th Cong. 3d Sess.
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Ofﬁce 1904), 40; Lamoreaux, Great Merger
Movement, ch. 6; Herbert Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American Law, 1836–1937
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), esp. ch. 20; Herbert Hovenkamp,
“State Antitrust in the Federal Scheme,” Indiana Law Journal 58 (1983): 375–432;
William G. Roy, Socializing Capital: The Rise of the Large Industrial Corporation in
America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).
13. May, “Antitrust Practice and Procedure”; and Lamoreaux, “Antimonopoly and State
Regulation of Corporations.”
14. Bruce Bringhurst, Antitrust and the Oil Monopoly: The Standard Oil Cases, 1890–
1911 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1979), 14.
15. Nolette, “Litigating the Public Interest,” 395.
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American Sugar Reﬁning trust when it sought to close down a company in
the state, but none of his predecessors had taken any action against the
combine, even though it had existed for some years and controlled all
the sugar reﬁneries in the state. Nor did New York ofﬁcials bring suit
against any of the other trusts that, like Standard Oil and the Cotton Oil
Trust, maintained headquarters in New York City.16
This variation continued through the ﬁrst several decades of the twentieth century. Some of the states that pursued quo warranto actions in the
1880s and 1890s became relatively quiescent in the new century
(Pennsylvania is a good example), but other states stepped up their activities.17 Texas’s antitrust initiative in petroleum, which played a major role
in restructuring that industry, began after the discovery of the Spindletop
oil ﬁeld in 1901 and continued for several decades after the United
States Supreme Court broke up the Standard Oil Company in 1911.18
Missouri and Kansas joined Texas’s attack on Standard and then took on
other trusts, most notably International Harvester.19 Other states also
moved against these companies, with as many as thirteen state attorneys
general meeting in St. Louis in 1907 to coordinate their prosecutions.20
These lawsuits were sufﬁciently bothersome that International Harvester
and other affected companies repeatedly appealed them (mostly unsuccessfully) to the United States Supreme Court, claiming that the prosecutions
violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process and equal protection
clauses.21
Regardless of their determination to challenge the trusts, state attorneys
general commonly lacked the funds and administrative capacity needed for
16. Wayne D. Collins, “Trusts and the Origins of Antitrust Legislation,” Fordham Law
Review 81 (2013): 2279–348, at 2327–28.
17. For general overviews, see J. J. Speight and Nathan B. Williams, Laws on Trusts and
Monopolies: Domestic and Foreign, with Authorities, revised ed. (Washington, DC:
Government Printing Ofﬁce, 1914); and Marketing Laws Survey, State Antitrust Laws
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Ofﬁce, 1940).
18. Joseph A. Pratt, “The Petroleum Industry in Transition: Antitrust and the Decline of
Monopoly Control in Oil,” Journal of Economic History 40 (1980): 815–37; Joseph A. Pratt
and Mark E. Steiner, “‘An Intent to Terrify’: State Antitrust in the Formative Years of the
Modern Oil Industry,” Washburn Law Journal 29 (1990): 270–89; Jonathan W. Singer,
Broken Trusts: The Texas Attorney General versus the Oil Industry, 1889–1909 (College
Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002); and William R. Childs, The Texas Railroad
Commission: Understanding Regulation in America to the Mid-Twentieth Century
(College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2005).
19. Steven L. Piott, The Anti-Monopoly Persuasion: Popular Resistance to the Rise of Big
Business in the Midwest (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1985).
20. Nolette, “Litigating the Public Interest,” 392–93.
21. Ruth H. Bloch and Naomi R. Lamoreaux, “Corporations and the Fourteenth
Amendment,” in Corporations and American Democracy, 286–325, at 296–97.
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effective enforcement. As a result, some of the early quo warranto suits
depended on private parties to initiate the complaint, coordinate the investigation, and/or fund the proceedings. Illinois’s victory against the Chicago
Gas Trust, for example, owed much to the activism of the Citizens’
Association of Chicago (CAC), a municipal reform league. The state’s
1872 general incorporation law stipulated that corporations could only be
formed for legal purposes, and required them to declare their purpose
along with other information when registering with the secretary of
state.22 Yet no ofﬁcial in that ofﬁce seems to have noticed that the
Chicago Gas Trust Company, organized in 1887, aimed to control all
the gas companies in the city, contrary to law. Francis Peabody, the
CAC’s president, brought this fact to the attention of Attorney General
George Hunt in 1888 and asked him to bring suit against the illegal corporation. Hunt agreed with Peabody’s assessment and, when the CAC also
offered to pay for a special assistant, brought a quo warranto suit against
the company and won.23 Taking the CAC’s position, Justice Benjamin
Magruder of the Illinois Supreme Court declared, “To create one corporation that it may destroy the energies of all other corporations of a given
kind, and suck their life blood out of them, is not a ‘lawful purpose.’”
The court ordered the company dissolved.24
Over time most states took steps to build up their antitrust capabilities by
increasing funding and stafﬁng of the attorney general’s ofﬁce.25 Some
states also created new administrative bodies to scrutinize corporate charters and enforce conformity with both general incorporation and antitrust
laws. For example, in 1898 Kansas created a charter board to review applications for charters by domestic companies and also all requests by foreign
(out-of-state) corporations to do business in the state.26 Some states even
wrote provisions into their constitutions mandating the creation of “corporation commissions” responsible for regulating railroads and utilities but
also for overseeing corporations more generally. For example,
Oklahoma’s 1907 constitution mandated that “[t]he records, books, and
22. Illinois General Assembly, “An Act concerning corporations,” in force July 1, 1872,
§1–2. Unless otherwise noted, all citations to state laws are from the Session Laws collected
by Heinonline, https://www.heinonline.org/HOL/Index?index=sslusstate&collection=ssl.
23. Illinois Attorney General, Biennial Report (Springﬁeld, IL: H. W. Rokker, 1890), 34–41.
Pennsylvania similarly obtained assistance from an association of independent oil producers in
bringing its suit against Standard Oil. See Chester M. Destler, Roger Sherman and the
Independent Oil Men (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1967), 83–193.
24. People v. Chicago Gas Trust, 130 Ill. 268 (1889), at 298.
25. These increases can be tracked in the regular reports ﬁled by state attorneys general,
most of which are available on hathitrust.org.
26. Kansas Attorney General, Twelfth Biennial Report (Topeka: W. Y. Morgan, 1900),
13–14.
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ﬁles of all corporations shall be, at all times, liable and subject to the full
visitorial and inquisitorial powers of the State.” It vested these powers in a
commission, to which any resident could submit grievance.27
Despite these investments, attorneys general complained that their budgets were not sufﬁcient for effective enforcement, and they probably were
not. Even in Texas, a state with many successful antitrust prosecutions, the
attorney general’s ofﬁce was woefully underfunded. Texas compensated
for the lack of administrative capacity at the top by granting district and
county attorneys a share of any damages from antitrust suits, thus providing “an undersized attorney general’s department with investigators.”28
Other states imposed statutory obligations on local ofﬁcials to aid in antitrust enforcement, and most also included incentives in their antitrust laws
for private parties injured by anticompetitive behavior to sue.29 In addition,
as we will show in the next section, shareholders might be enlisted in the
struggle against the trusts.

The Antitrust Applications of Shareholders’ Derivative Suits
If state attorneys general lacked the capacity (or the will) to ensure that corporations conformed to the law, there was still the possibility that shareholders would take action under state incorporation statutes or more
general principles of law and equity. Shareholders had two basic ways to
proceed. They could bring direct action suits in a court of law if the corporation’s ofﬁcers had violated their rights, for example, by preventing
them from voting at a general meeting or denying them access to the corporation’s books. Shareholders could also ﬁle derivative suits in a court of
equity if they had evidence that the corporation’s ofﬁcers and directors had
engaged in illegal or fraudulent activities to the detriment of the ﬁrm. In the
latter case, the injured party was technically the corporation itself, but
shareholders had legal standing to sue if they could show that the corporation was under the control of the alleged wrongdoers.30 Although most
shareholders’ suits involved disputes over internal business decisions that
27. Oklahoma, 1907 Constitution, Art. 2, Sec. 28, and Art. 9, Sec. 15–25. For similar provisions, see New Mexico, 1911 Constitution, Art. 11; and Arizona, 1912 Constitution, Art.
14, Sec. 8 and 17, and Art. 15. For the text of these constitutions, see the NBER/Maryland
State Constitutions Project, http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/index.aspx.
28. Singer, Broken Trusts, 219–220, 293 n25.
29. “Legislation: A Collection and Survey of State Anti-Trust Laws,” Columbia Law
Review 32 (1932): 347–66, at 361–62; Davies, Trust Laws and Unfair Competition, 211–16.
30. J. B., “Distinguishing between Direct and Derivative Shareholder Suits,” University of
Pennsylvania Law Review 110 (1962): 1147–57.
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had nothing to do with competition policy, during the merger waves of the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, combines often acquired businesses with the aim of shutting them down—what is today referred to as a
“killer acquisition.” Shareholders who were adversely affected by the closings sometimes launched derivative suits to block the mergers, claiming
that the majority was using its voting control for illegal purposes. In this
way, private suits about corporate governance might advance broader antitrust goals.
Nineteenth-century policy makers understood that shareholders could
serve as a check on those in control of corporations, and for this reason,
many states imposed voting rules that boosted the power of minority shareholders.31 But policy makers also worried that self-interested shareholders
might use litigation to extract more than their fair share of corporate revenues. Mergers were particularly problematic because, under common-law
rules, they required shareholders’ unanimous consent and hence gave
unscrupulous owners the ability to block proﬁtable deals unless they were
paid off. Following New Jersey’s lead in 1888, most states solved this problem by enacting statutes that routinized the merger process, setting a voting
threshold for approval and providing a procedure for buying out dissenting
stockholders. The voting threshold could be lower or higher depending on
where policy makers wanted to set the balance of power between shareholders and directors. New Jersey’s law required only a simple majority vote,
but Massachusetts, Illinois, and California mandated two thirds.32
Derivative suits posed similar trade-offs. On the one hand, judges recognized that the purpose of these suits was to provide shareholders with a remedy against exploitation by corporate directors. On the other, they worried
that shareholders would use these challenges opportunistically to extract payouts or that the courts would be deluged with cases from shareholders who
disagreed with directors’ business strategies. These concerns led judges to
31. The most common method was to mandate cumulative voting, whereby shareholders
received as many votes as there were directors being elected and had the option of spreading
them over an equal number of candidates, voting them all for one candidate, or anything in
between. By 1900, seventeen states had such rules. Charles M. Williams, Cumulative Voting
for Directors (Boston: Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University,
1951), 20.
32. New Jersey General Assembly, “An Act relating to the consolidation of corporations
. . .,” approved April 17, 1888; Massachusetts General Court, “An Act relative to business
corporations,” approved June 17, 1903, §40; Illinois General Assembly, “An Act in relation
to corporations for pecuniary proﬁt,” approved June 28, 1919, §67; and California General
Assembly, “An Act substituting for the existing title one of part four of division ﬁrst of the
Civil Code . . .,” approved June 12, 1931, §361. See also William J. Carney, “Fundamental
Corporate Changes, Minority Shareholders, and Business Purposes,” American Bar
Foundation Research Journal 1980 (1980): 69–132.
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impose high evidentiary requirements for such actions. Not only did shareholders have to demonstrate that they had no means of addressing the problem through normal corporate governance procedures, but they also had to
show that the directors’ behavior was illegal or fraudulent. If the disagreement was simply a matter of “business judgment,” then the courts would
not intervene, even if the corporation sustained heavy losses.33
In the early years of the antitrust movement, the high bar that judges
applied to derivative suits carried over to cases involving anticompetitive
mergers. In 1891, for example, a Louisiana court rebuffed a minority shareholder in the Bienville Oil Works, who sued to recover damages after the
company was dissolved and its assets sold to the American Cotton Oil
Trust. Four years earlier, a district court in the Parish of Orleans had issued
an injunction prohibiting the trust from doing business in Louisiana
because it had not incorporated under state laws, paid no taxes, and
aimed to monopolize Southern oil mills.34 Piggybacking on this ruling,
the Bienville shareholder claimed that the directors had, “by a secret and
fraudulent combination and bargain with the American Oil Trust, an
alleged unlawful organization,” transferred their stock to the trust “to subserve its own interests, and in disregard of their obligations to the other
stock holders and in violation of their rights, have thus wrecked the company, thereby destroying the value of its stock other than that held by the
trust.”35 The Louisiana Supreme Court determined, however, that the
plaintiff—“an unfortunate and improvident loser”—could have followed
the other stockholders’ example and exchanged his shares for certiﬁcates
in the trust. Even after the deadline for the exchange expired, he had
been offered some money for his shares, but he held out for a higher
price. His losses therefore were his own fault, and he had “no occasion
legally to complain.” In the absence of any express statutory prohibition
or fraud, the requisite majority of stockholders had “absolute” discretion
to wind up the corporation’s affairs “for reasons by them deemed sufﬁcient,” and the court had no authority to second guess their decision.36
33. Hodges v. New England Screw Co., 1 R.I. 312 (1850) and 3 R.I. 9 (1853); Brewer
v. Boston Theatre, 104 Mass. 378 (1870); Wardell v. Railroad Company, 103 U.S. 651
(1880); Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881); Dunphy v. Traveller Newspaper Assoc.,
146 Mass. 495 (1888); Leslie v. Lorillard, 110 N.Y. 519 (1888); Edison v. Edison United
Phonograph Co., 52 N.J. Eq. 620 (1894); and Burden v. Burden, 159 N.Y. 287 (1899).
34. See State v. American Cotton Oil Trust, as reported in Railway and Corporate Law
Journal 1 (1887): 509–13.
35. Trisconi v. Winship, 43 La. Ann. 45 (1891), at 47–48.
36. Trisconi v. Winship, 49–50. For other cases with similar outcomes, see Ellerman
v. Chicago Junction Railways, 49 N.J. Eq. 217 (1891); and Rafferty v. Buffalo City Gas
Co., 56 N.Y.S. 288 (1899).
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Judges were willing to limit controlling shareholders’ “absolute” discretion in cases in which government ofﬁcials, rather than minority shareholders, challenged a merger as ultra vires. For example, in 1890, Nebraska’s
attorney general brought suit to revoke the charter of a corporation whose
shareholders had sold its property to a trust. In this case, the court ruled that
“the fact that the corporation has authority to put an end to its existence by
a vote of a majority of its stockholders . . . does not authorize it to terminate
its existence by a sale and disposal of all its property and rights” to an “illegal combination” out to “destroy competition and create a monopoly.”37
Judges were reluctant, however, to allow shareholders to usurp the attorney
general’s powers and make claims on the basis of public policy. Illinois’s
Supreme Court dismissed a suit by a shareholder who sought the dissolution of the National Linseed Oil Company on the grounds that it was an
illegal combination, insisting that “[o]nly the State can complain of injury
to the public or that public rights are being interfered with, and enforce a
forfeiture of defendant’s franchise for that reason.”38 In this case, the
state’s activist Attorney General, Maurice Moloney, followed up by ﬁling
a quo warranto suit, which National Linseed belittled as just “a rehash of a
bill previously ﬁled” by the stockholder.39
There was no guarantee that attorneys general would take action, however, and so, as the Great Merger Movement gained momentum in the
late 1890s, some judges began to lay out a legal justiﬁcation for private
derivative suits that served public antitrust objectives. Just one year after
the Illinois Supreme Court dismissed the private suit against National
Linseed, it permitted a shareholder in another corporation to block the
sale of its factory to the American Glucose Company, a consolidation organized as a New Jersey corporation.40 Justice Magruder, who had earlier
written the decision dissolving the Chicago Gas Trust, delivered the court’s
opinion. A thrice-elected Republican jurist, he would be remembered, posthumously, for his “righteous indignation at the schemes of fraud and indiscretion by which some of the great enterprises of modern business life have
been accomplished.”41 After a detailed recounting of the glucose combination’s scheme to have “six corporations shut down their manufactories, and
abandon their business” for the purpose of reducing competition in the
industry, Magruder ruled that the stockholder who brought the case had
37. State v. Nebraska Distilling Co., 29 Neb. 700 (1890), at 719.
38. Coquard v. National Linseed Oil Co., 171 Ill. 480 (1898), at 484.
39. “Illinois Corporations in Court,” Paint, Oil and Drug Review 21 (1896): 11–12. See
also People v. National Linseed Oil Co., as reported in Illinois Attorney General, Biennial
Report (Springﬁeld, IL: Phillips Bros., 1897), 182–94.
40. Harding v. American Glucose Co., 182 Ill. 551 (1899).
41. “Obituary: Benjamin Drake Magruder,” Chicago Legal News 42 (1910): 297.
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standing to sue because the value of his shares would be adversely affected
by the planned closure. “If the purpose of such dissolution is not the bona
ﬁde discontinuance of the business, but is the continuance of the business
by another new corporation, then the . . . dissolution is practically a fraud
on dissenting stockholders.”42 That declaration would have been enough
to decide the case, but Magruder went further. Citing William Cook’s treatise on corporations, he asserted that selling the company to the combine
exceeded the powers of the corporate directors, violating not only public
policy but also shareholders’ rights. “Any act or proposed act of the corporation, or of the directors, or of a majority of the stockholders, which is not
within the expressed or implied powers of the charter of incorporation, or
of association—in other words, any ultra vires act—is a breach of the contract between the corporation and each one of its stockholders.” Therefore,
“any one or more of the stockholders may object thereto, and compel the
corporation to observe the terms of the contract as set forth in the
charter.”43
This ruling granted shareholders formidable powers to challenge anticompetitive mergers. That the court intended to embolden shareholders
to contest mergers was conﬁrmed a few years later in Dunbar
v. American Telephone and Telegraph Company, a decision written by
another long-serving Republican jurist on the Illinois Supreme Court,
Jacob W. Wilkin. Shareholders in the Kellogg Switchboard and Supply
Company had brought suit to prevent AT&T from acquiring their ﬁrm.
As in the American Glucose case, the court held that AT&T had purchased
the company’s stock with “the unlawful purpose and intention of putting
[it] out of business or so using and controlling it as to prevent rivalry in
business and creating a monopoly.” To allow the acquisition to go ahead
“would be against the law of this State and its public policy.” It therefore
followed that “each and every stockholder” in the switchboard company
had the right to sue to restrain AT&T from voting “stock which it did
not and could not legally own.”44
Judges remained wary of opportunistic shareholders and, especially
where antitrust concerns were not involved, continued to impose high
42. Harding v. American Glucose Co., 601, 632.
43. Harding v. American Glucose Co., 631. The citation was to William W. Cook, A
Treatise on the Law of Corporations Having a Capital Stock, 4th ed. (Chicago:
Callaghan, 1898), Vol. 2, §669–70.
44. Dunbar v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 22, 25–26. The judge cited the
Chicago Gas Trust and American Glucose cases, as well as the United States Supreme
Court’s decision in Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904). For
another similarly decided case, see Bigelow v. Calumet & Hecla Mining Co., 155 F. 869
(1907).
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barriers to derivative suits. The very next year after the Illinois Supreme
Court found against AT&T in Dunbar, an appeals court in the same
state dismissed a suit by shareholders in the Universal Voting Machine
Company who charged that the directors had “fraudulently contrived to
wreck” their company by transferring its property to an out-of-state corporation. The court distinguished the case from Dunbar, which also involved
a foreign corporation, on the grounds that the transfer did “not appear to
have been performed for the furtherance of any illegal trust or
combination.” Because the acquisition was not “contrary to the general
public policy of the state of Illinois,” the court would not intervene. “To
grant the relief prayed would be clearly an interference with the internal
management of a foreign company” and therefore beyond the court’s jurisdiction.45 Nonetheless, the Dunbar and American Glucose cases show how
judges’ concerns about anticompetitive mergers could over-ride their reservations about derivative suits. Whether shareholders were opportunistic or
not, they offered jurists a valuable ally in an environment where attorneys
general often lacked either the capacity or the will to move against monopolistic combinations.
Many state legislatures revised their general incorporation laws to facilitate this kind of assistance, often adding anti-monopoly provisions that
expanded the grounds on which shareholders, as well as state attorneys
general, could challenge anticompetitive mergers. For example, when
New York liberalized its merger provisions in response to New Jersey’s
enactments, it added the proviso that “[n]o stock corporation shall combine
with any other corporation for the prevention of competition.”46 A number
of other states, including Ohio and Illinois, similarly amended their general
incorporation laws to facilitate ordinary mergers but prohibit them for anticompetitive purposes.47 Even New Jersey followed suit when it enacted its
so-called “Seven Sisters” antitrust laws in 1913, although the resulting loss
of its chartering revenues caused it quickly to backtrack.48
That these statutes facilitated shareholders’ suits can be seen from the
experience of Clarence H. Venner, a professional litigant who made a
career of ﬁling derivative suits against deep-pocket ﬁnanciers and major
public corporations.49 Venner used the prohibition against anticompetitive
45. Sprague v. Universal Voting Machine Co., 134 Ill. App. 379 (1907), at 380, 385.
46. New York Legislature, “An Act in relation to stock corporations . . .” approved June 7,
1890, §7.
47. Davies, Trust Laws and Unfair Competition, 199–202.
48. F. A. Updyke, “New Jersey Corporation Laws,” American Political Science Review 7
(1913): 650–52; Seager and Gulick, Trust and Corporation Problems, 361–65.
49. Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation, 34–36; J. A. Livingston, The American
Stockholder (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1958), 49–55; “Old Sue-&-Settle Man,” Time,
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mergers in New York’s stock company law to bring a complaint against the
Interborough Rapid Transit Company and the ﬁnanciers who underwrote
the combination. Venner ultimately was not able to convince the federal
judge who heard the suit that Interborough was an illegal monopoly, in
part because he was exactly the kind of plaintiff jurists distrusted. As the
judge observed sarcastically, “Much time has been devoted to picturing
the evil result of monopoly, but nothing has been done toward showing
that complainant has lost a dollar by exactly what Mr. Venner knew was
going to be done when he caused the stock to be purchased.”50
Nonetheless, without the existence of New York law, it is doubtful whether
Venner would even have gotten his day in court. In an earlier proceeding,
the transit company had tried to block the lawsuit, but another federal
judge allowed it to proceed on the grounds that the complainants had properly alleged the company to be an unlawful monopoly under the merger
section of New York’s stock company law.51

Shareholders’ Challenges to the Use of Voting
Trusts for Monopoly Control
Just as judges’ openness to shareholders’ derivative suits waxed and waned
in response to the perceived threat of anticompetitive combinations, so too
did their receptivity toward corporate voting trusts. Traditionally judges
had seen nothing wrong with voting trusts and had looked with disfavor
on shareholders’ suits to invalidate them. The growing use of the device
as a tool of horizontal combination seems to have spurred judges to rethink
the matter, however, and by the late 1880s, they had begun to question the
validity of voting trusts in which stockholders irrevocably transferred control over their shares to a group of external trustees—that is, precisely the
kinds of agreements that consolidations like Standard Oil were exploiting.
Once Standard and other trusts reorganized as New Jersey holding companies, the issue lost much of its urgency, and the case law began to revert to
November 21, 1932, 39; and “Extortionate Corporate Litigation: The Strike Suit,” Columbia
Law Review 34 (1934): 1308–21, at 1308, n1. A search through LexisNexis for 1889 to
1927, shows that Venner brought suit as a stockholder against US Steel, American
Telephone & Telegraph, Amalgamated Copper, Bethlehem Steel, and American Hide &
Leather, to name a few, as well as against numerous railroads.
50. Continental Securities v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 207 F. 467 (1913), at 472.
The decision was afﬁrmed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in 221 F. 44 (1915).
51. Continental Securities Company v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 165 F. 945
(1908). The judge cited a similar ruling in Burrows v. Interborough Metropolitan Co.,
156 F. 389 (1907).
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its original posture. But judges’ concerns came back as a result of
Congress’s Money Trust investigation in 1912–13, when investigators
charged that J.P. Morgan and other bankers were using voting trusts to control broad swaths of the American economy.
The ﬁrst judicial turn against irrevocable voting trusts had its origin in a
dispute among railroad tycoons that raged in Standard’s home state of Ohio
during the 1880s. Investors allied with Collis P. Huntington had sought to
withdraw the shares they held in the Cincinnati, Hamilton & Dayton
Railroad from a voting trust controlled by Hugh J. Jewett, former president
of the Erie Railroad. When Jewett and his allies denied their request, they
sued and won in Grifﬁth v. Jewett.52 The local Ohio judge who heard the
case thought there was nothing illegal about such agreements per se, but he
insisted that they had to be revocable. Citing precedents asserting that “the
right to vote is an incident of the ownership of stock, and can not exist
apart from it,” he ruled that shareholders could not be prevented from withdrawing from voting trusts if they so desired. Otherwise “it may come to
pass that the ownership of a majority of the stock of a company may be
vested in one set of persons, and the control of the company irrevocably
invested in others.” Such a state of affairs, he declared, would be “intolerable” and contrary to the “universal policy” of law that “the control of
stock companies shall be and remain with the owners of the stock.”53 Of
course, this “intolerable” state of affairs was exactly what was happening
at that very moment in the companies acquired by Standard Oil and the
other trusts, although the judge did not make the connection in his opinion.
The decision in Grifﬁth v. Jewett caught the attention of Simeon
E. Baldwin, a prominent professor at the Yale Law School and later
chief justice of the Connecticut Supreme Court.54 Baldwin had agreed to
represent a group of shareholders seeking to withdraw from the voting
trust organized to transfer control over the Shepaug, Litchﬁeld &
Northern Railroad to the Mercantile Trust Company of New York, and it
was most likely he who brought Grifﬁth to the attention of the
52. For background on the case, see Simeon E. Baldwin, “Voting-Trusts,” Yale Law
Journal 1 (1891): 1–15, at 6–10. See also “Railroads: The C., H. and D.-Erie Contract,”
Cincinnati Enquirer, April 24, 1885, 5; “In the Railroad World: Taking Mr. Jewett’s
Side,” New York Times, May 19, 1885, 5; and “The Railroads: Progress in the C., H. and
D. Case,” Cincinnati Enquirer, June 9, 1886, 6.
53. Grifﬁth v. Jewett, 9 Ohio Dec. Reprint 627 (1886).
54. “Simeon Eben Baldwin,” Museum of Connecticut History, https://museumofcthistory.
org/2015/08/simeon-eben-baldwin/ (August 18, 2021). The case was reported in the Weekly
Law Bulletin 15 (June 21, 1886), 419–23. It was also cited approvingly by a federal circuit
court judge, who allowed a shareholder to revoke a power of attorney granting Drexel,
Morgan & Co. the authority to sell his stock and vote it in the interim. Woodruff
v. Dubuque & S.C.R Co., 30 F. 91 (1887).
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Connecticut judge who heard the resulting Shepaug Voting Trusts Cases.
The judge not only cited the Ohio decision in his opinion invalidating
the trust but elaborated on the underlying principle: “It is the policy of
our law that ownership of stock shall control the property and the management of the corporation, and . . . this good policy is defeated, if stockholders are permitted to surrender all their discretion and will, in the important
matter of voting, and suffer themselves to be mere passive instruments in
the hands of some agent who has no interest in the stock, equitable or legal,
and no interest in the general prosperity of the corporation.” Voting was a
duty that the shareholder owed to other members of the corporation. The
shareholder “may shirk it perhaps by refusing to attend stockholders’ meetings, or by declining to vote when called upon, but the law will not allow
him to strip himself of the power to perform his duty.”55
The following year, Baldwin summarized the Shepaug decision and the
cases that preceded it in the Yale Law Journal with the explicit purpose of
making these rulings “accessible to the profession.”56 He seems to have
succeeded; just two years later the Connecticut judge’s words found
their way into a New Jersey chancery court decision, White v. Thomas
Inﬂatable Tire Company.57 The New Jersey court had already come to
the conclusion that voting trusts could not be irrevocable in an 1891 decision in Cone v. Russell & Mason, but it had decided that case without reference to the Connecticut or Ohio litigation.58 The two streams of case law
thus came together in the White case, and a ﬂurry of similar decisions followed based on the Connecticut and New Jersey precedents.59
There were still, however, some contrary decisions upholding shareholders’ contractual freedom to enter into voting-trust agreements, whether they
were revocable or not.60 After Standard and other combines abandoned
voting trusts in favor of New Jersey charters, concerns about the misuse
of these kinds of agreements seem to have ebbed, and, as Figure 1
55. Shepaug Voting Trust Cases, 60 Conn. 553 (1890), at 579–81.
56. Baldwin, “Voting-Trusts,” 14.
57. White v. Thomas Inﬂatable Tire Co., 52 N.J. Eq. 178 (1893).
58. Cone v. Russell & Mason, 48 N.J. Eq. 208 (1891). The case involved the use of a
voting trust to entrench a particular stockholder in a managerial position.
59. Harvey v. Linville Improvement Co., 118 N.C. 693 (1896); Kreissl v. Distilling Co. of
America, 61 N.J. Eq. 5 (1900); Warren v. Pim, 66 N.J. Eq. 353 (1904); Morel v. Hoge, 130
Ga. 625 (1908); Sheppard v. Rockingham Power Co., 150 N.C. 776 (1909); Bridgers v. First
National Bank, 152 N.C. 293 (1910); and Luthy v. Ream, 270 Ill. 170 (1915). In another
case, State v. O. & M.R.R. Co., 3 Ohio Cir. Dec. 518 (1892), the court upheld a voting
trust but noted that it would have been invalid if irrevocable. See also Marion Smith,
“Limitations on the Validity of Voting Trusts,” Columbia Law Review 22 (1922): 627–37.
60. Mobile & Ohio Railroad v. Nicholas, 98 Ala. 92 (1893); Smith v. San Francisco &
North Paciﬁc Railway Co., 115 Cal. 584 (1897); Brightman v. Bates, 175 Mass. 105 (1900).
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Figure 1. Judicial rulings on voting trusts. Sources and notes: See the Appendix table. The ﬁgure excludes cases in which the
court’s position on the revocability of a voting trust was coded as unclear in the table. The length of the bars represents the number of
cases in each category. Cases above the horizontal line are those in which judges ruled that voting trusts could not be irrevocable.
Below the line the rulings supported irrevocability. In some cases, judges declared that voting trusts could not be irrevocable but
refused to invalidate the particular voting trust at stake in the case. In other instances, they supported irrevocability but invalidated
the trust on other grounds. Dark shadings indicate cases in which the voting trust was invalidated or not enforced. Light shadings
indicate that the trust was upheld or enforced. The medium gray is for cases in which the trust was upheld for some shareholders but
not others.
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shows, decisions upholding voting trusts increased in frequency relative to
those invalidating them.61 Judge James Keith of the Virginia Supreme
Court reﬂected on this shift in a 1910 decision, Carnegie Trust
Co. v. Security Life Insurance Co., upholding an irrevocable 25-year voting
trust. It was “impossible,” he declared, “not to be impressed with the
change of opinion which has taken place with respect to the true nature
of such contracts.” Whereas “a very strong sentiment” against voting trusts
had once prevailed, “experience has demonstrated their usefulness, and the
hostility evinced toward them has by degrees diminished.”62 For Keith, the
cases of the preceding decade had clariﬁed the legal parameters of voting
trust agreements and, in the absence of a statute regulating them, he
thought that voting trusts should be judged by the reasonableness of
their objectives: “Where the object of the trust is legitimate . . . the trust
should be upheld and carried out.”63
Whether the case law would have continued to evolve in this more permissive direction is impossible to say, but attitudes toward voting trusts
were shaken up again by the Money Trust hearings that Congress held
in 1912. Headed by Louisiana Representative Arsène Pujo, the investigating committee focused its attention on the activities of J.P. Morgan &
Company and allied banking houses, and its report detailed the ways in
which these ﬁnanciers used interlocking directorates and voting trusts to
assert control over important sectors of the American economy.64
Although scholars have since challenged the validity of the committee’s
ﬁndings, the hearings were enormously inﬂuential, dominating newspaper
headlines whenever prominent witnesses like J.P. Morgan were called to
testify and also when the committee issued its ﬁnal report in 1913.65
The investigation’s impact was magniﬁed, moreover, by a series of
61. Chapman v. Bates, 61 N.J. Eq. 658 (1900); Boyer v. Nesbitt, 227 Pa. 398 (1910);
Bowditch v. Jackson Co., 76 N.H. 351 (1912); Carnegie Trust Co. v. Security Life
Insurance Co. of America, 111 Va. 1 (1910); Thompson-Starrett Co. v. Ellis Granite Co.,
86 Vt. 282 (1912); and Winsor v. Commonwealth Coal Co., 63 Wash. 62 (1911).
62. Carnegie Trust Co. v. Security Life Insurance Co., 20.
63. Carnegie Trust Co. v. Security Life Insurance Co., 23.
64. See US House of Representatives, “Report of the Committee Appointed . . . to
Investigate the Concentration of Control of Money and Credit,” Report 1593, 62nd
Cong., 3d Sess. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Ofﬁce, 1913).
65. See Vincent P. Carosso, “The Wall Street Money Trust from Pujo through Medina,”
Business History Review 47 (1973): 421–37; J. Bradford De Long, “Did J. P. Morgan’s Men
Add Value? An Economist’s Perspective on Finance Capitalism,” in Inside the Business
Enterprise: Historical Perspectives on the Use of Information, ed. Peter Temin (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1991): 205–36; and Mary A. O’Sullivan, Dividends of
Development: Securities Markets in the History of U.S. Capitalism, 1866–1922 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2016), ch. 7.
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polemical essays that Louis Brandeis published in Harper’s Weekly in late
1913 and early 1914 under the title “Breaking the Money Trust.” The
essays were subsequently collected and published, along with several
other pieces on the same subject, in a popular book entitled Other
People’s Money and How the Bankers Use It, which echoed the Pujo
Committee’s ﬁndings.66
According to the Pujo Committee’s report and Brandeis’s exposé, bankers had extended their dominance over a myriad of other businesses—
ﬁnancial and industrial—by means that included direct investments, interlocking directorates, and voting trusts. Because voting trusts did not require
the bankers to make any substantial investment outlays, they were a particularly attractive way of controlling non-ﬁnancial companies. Morgan had
ﬁrst experimented with the device in 1886 when he reorganized the bankrupt Philadelphia and Reading Railroad, shifting oversight of the railroad’s
business to a board of trustees headed by himself. The board not only monitored the internal operation of the road but negotiated a division of the
market with the Pennsylvania Railroad and organized a pool among anthracite coal producers, the railroad’s main source of freight. From the beginning, therefore, Morgan’s use of the device to reorganize an insolvent
railroad was coupled with initiatives to reduce competition.67 The experiment was so successful that Morgan repeated it again and again, and his
example was widely copied by other bankers. At the time of the Pujo hearings, Morgan and his allies were using voting trusts to assert managerial
authority over a wide variety of concerns, including the Bankers Trust
Company, the Guaranty Trust Company, the Southern Railway
Company, the Chicago Great Western Railroad, the Cincinnati, Hamilton
& Dayton Railway, the International Mercantile Marine Company,
William Cramp Ship & Engine Building Company, and the International
Agriculture Corporation.68
Although the Pujo Committee was primarily concerned with documenting the ways in which the money trust had extended its control over major
sectors of the economy, the investigation also emphasized the dire effects
that banker-dominated voting trusts could have on minority shareholders in
the affected companies. The report accused Morgan and other bankers of
abusing their positions of control by extracting high fees for their
66. Louis D. Brandeis, Other People’s Money and How the Bankers Use It (New York:
Fredrick A. Stokes, 1914).
67. Vincent P. Carosso, The Morgans: Private International Bankers, 1854–1913
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 260–62. Morgan was not the ﬁrst to
use voting trusts for the purpose of reorganizing a railroad. See Harry A. Cushing, Voting
Trusts: A Chapter in Modern Corporate History (New York: Macmillan, 1927), 4–10.
68. US House of Representatives, “Report of the Committee,” 57–91.
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underwriting services and by acquiring securities at prices below their fair
market value.69 The investigators also charged them with more direct
forms of minority oppression. For example, when the voting trust formed
to reorganize the Southern Railway expired in 1902, Morgan asked certificate holders to extend the agreement. A majority agreed and obtained new
trust certiﬁcates to replace the old. The new certiﬁcates were then listed on
the New York Stock Exchange and the old ones were de-listed. Only the
railroad’s trust certiﬁcates traded on the exchange, not its shares. As a
result, the holders of 183,938 shares who had voted against joining the
new trust “found themselves with a security not listed on the exchange,
and, therefore, without a ready market and not available as collateral.”70
Accounts from the time treated the de-listing as punishment for the “stubborn” shareholders’ refusal to support the renewal of the trust. As one
newspaper put it, “recalcitrant stockholders” were “feeling the iron hand
of the ﬁnancial autocrat.”71 When the Pujo Committee revisited these
events a decade later, the situation for these shareholders had not materially
improved, and Morgan’s voting trust still controlled the railroad.72
The Pujo Committee’s revelations prompted judges once again to
rethink their acquiescence in voting trusts. None of their subsequent rulings
contained a smoking gun in the form of an explicit mention of the Pujo
hearings or Brandeis’s writings, which of course would have represented
an inappropriate intrusion of politics into the cases they were deciding.
That there was a change in their views, however, can be seen from two
contradictory decisions about voting trusts handed down by the Illinois
Supreme Court in 1913 and 1915, both written by the court’s chief justice,
Frank K. Dunn—a Republican who succeeded Justice Wilkin on the
bench. The ﬁrst, Venner v. Chicago City Railway Company, was a derivative suit that targeted Morgan directly, charging him with using a voting
trust to combine Chicago’s street railway lines into an illegal monopoly. In
this case, the court upheld the agreement, in part because the plaintiff, the
aforementioned Clarence H. Venner, was exactly the kind of opportunistic
litigant who raised judges’ suspicions.73 The second case, Luthy v. Ream,
involved a single ﬁrm, the Peru Plow Company, and had no antimonopoly
69. US House of Representatives, “Report of the Committee,” 133–35.
70. US House of Representatives, “Report of the Committee,” 40–41.
71. “No Market on ‘Change for ‘Stubborn’ Southern Stockholders: Morgan Shows his
Hand: Opponents of Voting Trust Are Punished: Litigation May Follow,” Louisville,
Kentucky Courier-Journal (Nov. 12, 1902), 8.
72. US House of Representatives, “Report of the Committee,” 41. See also Samuel
Untemyer, “A Legislative Program to Restore Business Freedom and Conﬁdence,”
Address to the Illinois Manufacturers’ Association (January 5, 1914).
73. Venner v. Chicago City Railway Co., 258 Ill. 523 (1913).
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implications. Nonetheless, the suit turned on issues that the Pujo hearings
had made notorious, including the claim that the voting trust was a cover
for insider dealing. Not only did the plaintiffs win, but Chief Justice Dunn
used his decision to attack the legitimacy of voting trusts as a tool of corporate control, insisting that they must be made revocable at the will of participating shareholders.74
Venner brought the ﬁrst case after acquiring a minority interest in the
Chicago City Railway Company (CCRC), using his status as a shareholder
to challenge the legality of the voting trust formed to coordinate its operations with those of four other Chicago street railways. In his ﬁling, Venner
named Morgan, along with the CCRC, as a defendant, charging that the
trust agreement “irrevocably deprived” shareholders of their “deliberative
powers and duties” and transferred management of the railway to “the
hands of strangers.” He further claimed that the effect of the trust agreement was to create an illegal transit monopoly in the city of Chicago.75
Writing for the Illinois Supreme Court, Chief Justice Dunn systematically rejected each of Venner’s claims. Reaching back for precedent to
an Illinois case, Faulds v. Yates, decided in 1870—long before Grifﬁth
v. Jewett, Shepaug, or any of the other cases invalidating irrevocable voting
trusts—he ruled that voting trusts were an acceptable means of centralizing
managerial or ﬁnancial control in corporations.76 He bolstered this assertion by citing two of the most prominent decisions that had led the
turn-of-the-century swing back toward validating voting trusts, Smith
v. San Francisco & North Paciﬁc Railway Company (California, 1897)
and Brightman v. Bates (Massachusetts, 1900). Dunn recognized that
there had been an important line of contrary decisions between Faulds
and these later cases, and he even afﬁrmed them in dicta. However, he dismissed their relevance to Venner’s suit. The contrary cases had been
brought by shareholders seeking to withdraw their securities from voting
trusts, but since Venner was not a party to the CCRC trust agreement,
those precedents did not apply. “A majority of the stockholders may . . .
confer upon an agent unlimited discretion to vote their stock, and there
74. Luthy v. Ream (1915).
75. Venner v. Chicago City Railway Co. (1913), 538. To the press, Venner also charged
that the purpose of the merger was to deﬂect the CCRC’s earnings to shore up the “tottering
properties of the other companies,” but he seems not to have made this case to the court,
perhaps because there was as yet no track record for him to cite. After Venner lost his
suit, however, a group of discontented minority shareholders waged a proxy ﬁght for control
of the railroad and made essentially the same complaint. See “Opposes Chicago Merger,”
New York Times, January 23, 1910, 5; and “Protest Against Car Merger Plan,” Chicago
Daily Tribune, October 11, 1913, 9.
76. Faulds v. Yates, 57 Ill. 416 (1870).
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is no policy of the law to prevent their transferring the stock to a trustee
with the like unrestricted power.”77
Dunn’s position in his CCRC opinion was the same as that of Virginia
Supreme Court Justice Keith in Carnegie Trust Company. If voting trusts
were not illegal per se, “[i]t is the purpose for which the trust was created
which must determine its legality.”78 Dunn found Venner’s claim that
Morgan and his partners were creating an illegal transit monopoly unconvincing because most of the details of the consolidation had been approved
by a city ordinance, which Venner had earlier been unsuccessful in challenging.79 The one exception was the proposed merger of the elevated
with the street railway lines, which still required enabling legislation
from the state legislature as well as approval by the city. The railways
denied they were proceeding with the plan without this authorization,
and Dunn dismissed Venner’s charges as “mere apprehension.”
Although “anticipated unlawful acts of the directors of a corporation
may furnish ground for an injunction, fear, alone, of such illegal action
is not sufﬁcient.”80
Two years later, however, in the wake of the Pujo report and Brandeis’s
inﬂuential writings about the machinations of the money trust, Dunn took a
very different position, severely limiting the use of voting trusts regardless
of the legality of their purpose. Luthy v. Ream involved charges of selfdealing levied against ofﬁcers of the Peru Plow Company, who had used
their control of a voting trust, the minority shareholders complained, to
set their own salaries. The trial court declared the trust void, but the appeals
court overturned the decision, quoting extensively from Dunn’s opinion in
Venner v. Chicago City Railway.81 In siding with the trial judge, Dunn
could have simply ruled that the plow company’s voting trust served an
illegal purpose and was therefore invalid. However, he went on to quote
extensively from the opinion of the local Connecticut judge in the
Shepaug Voting Trust Cases, declaring that shareholders could not irrevocably commit their shares to voting trusts, and laying out the blanket rule
that shareholders could not “be deprived or deprive themselves” of their
voting power.82 “It matters not whether the end be beneﬁcial,” Dunn

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Venner v. Chicago City Railway Co. (1913), 540.
Ibid.
Venner v. Chicago City Railway Co., 236 Ill. 349 (1908).
Venner v. Chicago City Railway Co. (1913), 550.
Luthy v. Ream, 190 Ill. App. 315 (1914).
Luthy v. Ream (1915), 178.
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opined, “because it is not always possible to ascertain objects and motives,
and if such a severance were permissible it might be abused.”83
Dunn acknowledged that in Venner he had previously held it “legitimate
for the owners of a majority of the stock of a corporation to combine”
through a voting trust or other similar arrangement.84 But he attempted
to gloss over the extent to which he had reversed his previous opinion
by claiming that the Peru Plow agreement went “much farther than any
case which has heretofore arisen in this court” because it separated the voting power of the stock from its ownership for a ﬁxed term of ten years, “so
that the real owners of the property are during that time entirely divested of
its management and control.”85 By contrast, the agreement in the CCRC
case had speciﬁed a complicated mechanism whereby shareholders in
the trust voted annually for a committee of eight who then instructed the
trustees on the choice of directors, maintaining at least the appearance of
shareholders’ control.86 The decision in Luthy, however, turned on the
issue of revocability, and it is not at all clear that the CCRC agreement
was any different in this respect. The court had simply refused to look
into the matter on the grounds that Venner was not a party to the agreement. Moreover, Dunn effectively admitted that Luthy represented a reversal when he acknowledged that the Virginia Supreme Court’s assertion of a
rule of reason, as well the California and Massachusetts cases he had cited
as precedents in Venner, were “inconsistent with the views we have
expressed” and hence with “the true rule.”87
Although Dunn made no reference to the Pujo report in his Luthy decision, some contemporary observers blamed it for the shift in his attitude
and for his resuscitation of precedents from the 1890s. In an often-cited
review essay, for example, Fordham University law professor I. Maurice
Wormser disapprovingly summarized the ﬁndings of Pujo Committee,
asserting that its “agitation was not without its effect upon the courts”
and citing Luthy v. Ream as an “unprogressive and reactionary” decision
that reﬂected “the popular whim and caprice of the passing moment.”
Moreover, he implied, a similar inﬂuence was at work in the Missouri
Public Service Commission’s decision in 1916 to reject a plan proposing

83. Luthy v. Ream (1915), 180. He was quoting here approvingly from Charles Fisk
Beach, Commentaries on the Law of Private Corporations . . . (Chicago: T. H. Flood,
1891), Vol. 1, §306.
84. Luthy v. Ream (1915), 177.
85. Ibid.
86. Luthy v. Ream (1915), 181; and Venner v. Chicago City Railway Co. (1913), 541.
87. Luthy v. Ream (1915), 182.
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a “just and reasonable” voting trust to reorganize the St. Louis &
San Francisco Railroad.88
Other legal scholars applauded the new trend. Responding directly to
Wormser, Marion Smith saw Luthy as the culmination of a set of decisions
that began with the Shepaug Voting Trust Cases in 1890 and that collectively established the now “prevailing doctrine” that “a voting trust
whereby the beneﬁcial ownership in stock is separated from the voting
power is contrary to public policy and illegal, except under certain circumstances.”89 The problem, in Smith’s view, was to deﬁne the “certain circumstances” under which the courts would ﬁnd voting trusts
permissible. He attempted to articulate some basic principles in his article,
and others made similar efforts around the same time.90 But considerable
legal uncertainty remained. As Figure 1 shows, in the absence of statutory
guidance, judges continued to be divided on the issue of whether voting
trusts could be irrevocable, ﬁnding that they could not be in seven of the
cases reported on the issue between 1916 and 1930, but deciding the
other way in ﬁve.
Statutory Relief
With the legal status of irrevocable voting trusts increasingly unclear, state
legislatures began to provide the statutory guidance needed to resolve the
situation. Two states had responded to the ﬁrst wave of judicial concern
about voting trusts, but they had taken opposite positions on the issue.
New York had amended the state’s general corporation law in 1901 to permit any stockholder to enter into a written agreement to “transfer his stock
to any person or persons for the purpose of vesting in him or them the right
to vote thereon for a time not exceeding ﬁve years.”91 California, by contrast, made all voting trusts revocable. Responding to a decision by its high
88. I. Maurice Wormser, “The Legality of Corporate Voting Trusts and Pooling
Agreements,” Columbia Law Review 18 (1918): 123–36, at 127, 132. See also Vincent
Dougherty and John J. Berry Jr., “The Voting Trust—Its Present Status,” Georgetown
Law Journal 28 (1940): 1121–28, at 1122. Cushing, however, downplayed the effect of
the Pujo investigation in Voting Trusts, 26–30.
89. Smith, “Limitations on the Validity of Voting Trusts,” 630.
90. “Corporate Voting Trusts—Validity—Banks,” St. John’s Law Review 1 (1926): 65–71;
“Corporations—Validity of Voting Trusts,” Southern California Law Review 1 (1928): 479–83;
Robert W. Miller, “Voting Trusts,” Indiana Law Journal 4 (1929): 600–606; and Cushing,
Voting Trusts, ch. 3.
91. New York Legislature, “An Act to amend . . . the general corporation law,” approved
April 16, 1901. New York later extended the term of a voting trust to 10 years in “An Act to
amend the stock corporation law, generally,” approved May 24, 1923.
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court to enforce an irrevocable agreement, the legislature in 1905 enacted a
“clarifying” amendment to its general incorporation law that limited the
terms of such arrangements and mandated that they must always be revocable at the will of the shareholder.92 Maryland followed New York’s lead
in 1908, but no other state adopted either the New York or the California
model until fallout from the Pujo hearings induced an increasing number to
adopt a statute like New York’s. By 1940, twenty states (California now
included) had enacted legislation legalizing irrevocable voting trusts but
restricting their duration (usually to ten years), and by 1960, the number
had increased to thirty-nine. The Model Business Corporation Act adopted
by the American Bar Association in 1950 also included such a provision.93
These statutes made it possible for business people again to use voting
trusts for purposes long regarded as legitimate, such as inducing lenders to
come to the aid of corporations in ﬁnancial difﬁculty. Thus, when the
United States Food Products Corporation was reorganized in 1924, the
bankers who underwrote the rescue created voting trusts for both classes
of the new enterprise’s shares.94 Similarly, voting trusts formed a key
part of the plan to reﬁnance the Fox Film Corporation and the Fox
Theatres Corporation in 1930.95 In some cases, the courts themselves
played an important role in setting up the trusts. For example, a 1937
plan to salvage the New York Title and Mortgage Company proposed placing the capital stock of the reorganized company in a voting trust whose
trustees would be appointed by a state judge.96
Although the new statutes preserved voting trusts’ traditional utility, the
requirement that shareholders vote regularly to renew the agreements reduced
their attractiveness for anticompetitive purposes. If promoters wanted shareholders to vote to continue the trust, they would have to pass along more of
the monopoly gains to them or risk shareholder withdrawal. Not only that,
but given the courts’ changing views, it would no longer be advisable to
limit the beneﬁts to participants because disadvantaged minority shareholders
92. The case was Smith v. San Francisco & North Paciﬁc Railway Co., the decision cited
by Dunn in Venner v. Chicago City Railway Co. (1913). See California Legislature, “An act
. . . regulating the giving and use of proxies to vote corporate stock,” approved February 27,
1905. For a case invalidating a voting trust on the basis of this act, see Simpson v. Nielson,
77 Cal. App. 297 (1926).
93. Wormser, “Legality of Corporate Voting Trusts,” 125; Dougherty and Berry, “Voting
Trust,” 1124; and American Bar Foundation, Model Business Corporation Act Annotated
(St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1960), §32, 559–61. California, in a major reversal, allowed
irrevocable voting trusts with a duration of 21 years. California Legislature, “An act . . . relating to corporations,” approved June 12, 1931.
94. “New Products Co. Lists Its Stock,” New York Times, August 28, 1924, 25.
95. “Fox Boards Adopt New Financing Plan,” New York Times, February 19, 1930, 22.
96. “New Plan to Save New York Title Co.,” New York Times, December 3, 1937, 35.
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were likely to sue.97 The courts, moreover, seem to have strictly enforced
both the statutory time limits on voting trusts and the legal procedures for
renewing the agreements. In one important decision, Delaware’s chancery
court held that a voting trust whose duration exceeded the statutory limit
was invalid, even for the part of the term that was within the bounds of
the law.98 The same court nulliﬁed a vote to extend a trust on the grounds
that the members voted several years in advance of the agreement’s expiration, whereas the statute required the vote to occur within a year of the trust’s
terminal date.99 A New York court similarly abrogated a provision in a voting trust allowing the trustees to extend the agreement automatically at the
end of its term.100
One indication of the effectiveness of the change is that reformers who
railed against the use of voting trusts for monopoly control were no longer
able to ﬁnd many such agreements to criticize. William O. Douglas, a member of the newly formed Securities and Exchange Commission, declared at a
Bankers Club luncheon in 1937 that voting trusts were “little more than a
vehicle for corporate kidnapping,” but he furnished no evidence to support
his claim.101 Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means complained about the use of
voting trusts as a tool for separating ownership from control in their 1932
book, but they were able to muster few examples, and only one was really
on the mark: the voting trust set up by Morgan to control the much-litigated
Interborough Rapid Transit Company, which included an automatic renewal
arrangement of the type that the courts would very soon invalidate.102 Nor
did the massive investigations of the late 1930s and early 1940s conducted
by the Temporary National Economic Committee (TNEC) into “The
Concentration of Economic Power” uncover much more. Although committee members interrogated the country’s leading investment bankers, as well
as other witnesses, about voting trusts whenever they caught wind of them,
they turned up almost no examples. The committee questioned witnesses
extensively about a 10-year voting trust that the Harrimans had created to
pool stock held by family members and their associated companies in the
private bank of Harriman Ripley & Company. It also reproduced documents
about a deal in which members of the banking house of Ladenburg,
97. Derivative actions soared during the 1930s, as revelations of bad business behavior in
the run-up to the crash made judges more sympathetic to shareholders’ challenges. Coffee,
Entrepreneurial Litigation, 36–40.
98. Perry v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 22 Del. Ch. 33 (1937).
99. Belle Isle Corp. v. Corcoran, 29 Del. Ch. 554 (1946).
100. Kittinger v. Churchill Evangelistic Assn., 151 Misc. 350 (N.Y. 1934).
101. “End of Banks’ Rule in Industry Hinted,” New York Times, March 25, 1937, 37.
102. Adolph A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private
Property (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1932), 73, 83.
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Thalmann resigned from the voting trusts that managed a group of
Pittsburgh utilities in order to sell their shares in those companies.103 But
that was all the TNEC managed to come up with. The contrast with the
Pujo Committee’s ﬁndings were striking. Voting trusts, it seemed, were
no longer an important tool for bankers or anyone else to use to concentrate
economic power.
The Pujo Committee had recommended that the federal government prohibit the use of voting trusts in national banks.104 Congress took no action
on this advice or on voting trusts more generally, but it did write a ban on
certain kinds of interlocking directorates into the Clayton Act of 1914.
Scholars generally agree that this ban signiﬁcantly limited bank control
of railroads.105 We would add that the dramatic decline in bankers’ use
of voting trusts between the Pujo and TNEC investigations suggests that
shareholders’ lawsuits and the ensuing state statutes regulating voting trusts
deserve equal credit for the disappearance of ﬁnance capitalism in the
United States. We would also note that the Clayton Act’s provision prohibiting corporate acquisitions if the effect “may be to substantially lessen
competition . . . or tend to create a monopoly” echoed the provisions
restricting mergers that states were already writing into their general incorporation laws, setting up a symbiotic relationship between federal and state
competition policy.106 Hence when Illinois rewrote its general incorporation law in 1919, it in turn copied the Clayton Act’s language into its
own merger provision, making federal antitrust decisions relevant for interpreting Illinois corporation law.107 In this way too, federal law bolstered
state law and vice versa, rather than simply superseding it.

Conclusion
Scholars have long recognized that the states’ authority over their corporate
creatures bolstered their antitrust powers in ways that were not available to
103. See Temporary National Economic Committee, Hearings (Washington, DC:
Government Printing Ofﬁce, 1940), Part 22, 11,403–25, 11,519; and Part 24, 12,553,
12,860–65.
104. US House of Representatives, “Report of the Committee,” 142.
105. Miguel Cantillo Simon, “The Rise and Fall of Bank Control in the United States:
1890–1939,” American Economic Review 88 (1998): 1077–93; and Carola Frydman and
Eric Hilt, “Investment Banks as Corporate Monitors in the Early Twentieth Century
United States,” American Economic Review 107 (2017): 1938–70.
106. Clayton Act, section 7 (15 U.S.C. § 18).
107. For an example, see Moody & Waters Co. v. Case-Moody Pie Corp., 354 Ill. 82
(1933), at 96–97.
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the federal government. Our article adds to this literature—and also to the
literature on private enforcement regimes and private attorneys general—
by highlighting the ways in which judges used lawsuits that minority shareholders brought against their own companies to further antitrust goals.
Historically, judges had been reluctant to intervene in corporations’ internal affairs and were particularly wary of shareholders’ challenges to directors’ business decisions. By the end of the nineteenth century, however,
they had come to view shareholders’ private actions as potentially useful
checks on anticompetitive conduct. Concerned to forestall further concentrations of economic power, judges who normally would not have allowed
shareholders to challenge the business judgment of their corporations’ ofﬁcers found ways to encourage them to block anticompetitive mergers.
They also reconsidered the legitimacy of voting trusts. Again, judges had
historically seen nothing wrong with such agreements. If a majority of
shareholders wanted to combine their interests for the purposes of control,
there was nothing legally to prevent them, as long as they did not exploit
their power to oppress minority shareholders. However, evidence that the
device was being used for anticompetitive purposes—ﬁrst by Standard
Oil and other industrial trusts and then by J.P. Morgan and allied bankers
in the money trust—led judges to regard the enforcement of shareholders’
voting rights as a critical tool of public policy, and they increasingly invalidated agreements that irrevocably transferred corporate voting rights to a
set of trustees.
Judges’ changing treatment of shareholders’ suits in turn provoked state
legislatures to respond. Because the case law develops in piecemeal fashion, with some judges pushing the legal rules in novel directions and others
adhering to older precedents, this type of private regulatory enforcement
could heighten legal uncertainty. Thus a number of states rewrote their
general incorporation laws to make it illegal for corporations to merge
for anticompetitive purposes, transforming what had been derivative
suits into direct actions and effectively lowering the bar for shareholders
to enforce competition. Similarly, judges’ growing willingness to invalidate irrevocable voting trusts led most states to legalize the devices but
only for limited periods of time. These statutes restored the utility of voting
trusts for purposes that the courts had traditionally regarded as legitimate,
such as reorganizing companies in ﬁnancial distress, but they also reduced
the trusts’ effectiveness for consolidating economic power.
Scholars have long appreciated the complex matrix of enforcement
regimes that developed at both the national and state levels through public
and private antitrust suits, but they have neglected the ways in which shareholder actions and changes in state corporation law and equity jurisprudence shaped competition policy. Our study of the lawsuits brought by
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shareholders to challenge anticompetitive mergers and irrevocable voting
trusts has begun to redress this imbalance. Not only did these actions reinforce contemporary initiatives in the antitrust arena, they also mattered over
the long run, reducing the arsenal of weapons that the wealthy and powerful could deploy for anticompetitive purposes and transforming “each and
every stockholder” into a potential competition watchdog.
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1867 Brown v. Pacific Mail
Steamship Co.
1870 Faulds v. Yates
1885 Hafer v. N.Y., L.E.
and W. R.R.
1886 Griffith v. Jewett
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voting trust?

4 F. Cas. 420
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In part
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Yes
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Yes

Yes
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No
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No
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57 Ill. 416
9 Ohio Dec.
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Reprint 627
Woodruff v. Dubuque 30 F. 91
and S. C. R. Co.
Vanderbilt v. Bennett 6 Pa. C. C. 193
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84 Ala. 608
Shelmerdine v. Welsh 20 Phil. 199
Shepaug Voting Trust 60 Conn. 553
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48 N.J. Eq. 208
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50 F. 338
Clarke v Central
Railroad & Banking
Co.
Railway Co. v. State 49 Ohio St. 668
Greene v. Nash
85 Me. 148
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White v. Thomas
52 N.J. Eq. 178
Inflatable Tire Co.
Hey v. Dolphin
71 N.Y.S. 627
Gage v. Fisher
5 N.D. 297
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1896 Harvey v. Linville
Imp. Co.
1897 Smith
v. San Francisco &
North Pacific
Railway Co.
1900 Brightman v. Bates
1900 Clowes v. Miller
1900 Kreissl v. Distilling
Co. of Am.
1900 Chapman v. Bates
1902 Sullivan v. Parkes
1904 Warren v. Pim
1905 Gray v. Bloomington
& N. Railway
1908 Morel v. Hoge
1909 Bridgers v. Stanton
1909 Sheppard
v. Rockingham Power
Co.
1909 White v. Snell
1910 Carnegie Trust
Co. v. Security Life
Ins. Co. of America
1910 Boyer v. Nesbitt
1910 Bridgers v. First Nat.
Bank
1910 Hall v. Merrill
Trust Co.
1911 Ecker v. Kentucky
Refining Co.
1911 Winsor
v. Commonwealth
Coal Co.
1911 Commonwealth ex
rel. Clark
v. Roydhouse
1912 Bowditch v. Jackson
Co.
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Ruling against
irrevocability?

Ruling against
voting trust?

118 N.C. 693

Yes

Yes

115 Cal. 584

No

No

175 Mass. 105
60 N.J. Eq. 179
61 N.J. Eq. 5

No
Yes
Yes

No
Yes
Yes

61 N.J. Eq. 658
74. N.Y.S. 787
66 N.J. Eq. 353
120 Ill. App. 159

No
Yes
Unclear
No

No
Yes
Yes
No

130 Ga. 625
150 N.C. 216
150 N.C. 776

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

35 Utah 434
111 Va. 1

Unclear
No

No
No

227 Pa. 398
152 N.C. 293

No
Yes

No
Yes

106 Me. 465

No

No

144 Ky. 264

No

No

63 Wash. 62

No

No

233 Pa. 234

Yes

Yes

76 N.H. 351

No
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1912 Thompson-Starrett
Co. v. Ellis Granite
Co.
1913 Colonial Coal
v. Ream
1913 Venner v. Chicago
City Railway Co.
1914 Gleason v. Earles
1915 Luthy v. Ream
1917 Clark v. Foster
1917 Craig v. Bessie
Furnace Co.
1917 Thompson
v. Thompson
Carnation Co.
1919 Frost v. Carse
1920 Billings v. Marshall
Furnace Co.
1922 English
v. Rosenkrantz
1923 Bullivant v. First Nat.
Bank of Boston
1923 Felt v. United States
Mortg. & Trust Co.
1925 Thibadeau v. Lake
1926 Mackin v. Nicollet
Hotel, Inc.
1927 Babcock v. Chicago
Rys. Co.
1927 Abbot v. Waltham
Watch Co.

Citation

Ruling against
irrevocability?

Ruling against
voting trust?

86 Vt. 282

No

No

114 Va. 800

Unclear

Yes

258 Ill. 523

No

No

78 Wash. 491
270 Ill. 170
98 Wash. 241
27 Ohio Dec. 471

Yes
Yes
No
Yes

No
Yes
No
No

279 Ill. 54

Yes

No

91 N.J. Eq. 124
210 Mich. 1

No
Yes

No
Yes

152 Ga. 726

Yes

Yes

246 Mass. 324

No

No

231 Ill. App. 110 Yes

No

40 Idaho 456
10 F.2d 375

Yes
No

Yes
No

325 Ill. 16

Yes

No

260 Mass. 81

No

No

Notes: The table includes reported cases challenging voting trusts if they were decided before the
enactment of a state statute regulating the duration and revocability of voting trusts or before 1930,
whichever was earlier. If a reported case was appealed to a higher court, we included only the
higher-court ruling. We marked cases as unclear in the column about revocability if that issue was
not a factor in the court’s decision and was not explicitly addressed.
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